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Nonviolence and Authoritarian Regimes

QSHB

PROMOTING SOCIAL CHANGE IN AUTHORITARIAN RmIMll 'l'HROUOH
ACTIVE NONVIOLENCE
by Ron Mock

February 1986 was a month of sudden, startling, and
essentially nonviolent triumph
over
detested,
violent
dictators
Ferdinand Marcos of the
Philippines
and
Jean-Claude Th1valier of Haiti. In just three months, events
in both countries unfolded in dramatic fashion, ending in the
dissolution of dictatorships which had seemed invincible as
late as November, 1985.
Clearly something powerful was at work, and it was not
the violent revolution both dictators had publicly described
a5
the principal threat to
the
stability
of
their
governments.
In the
euphoria
prevailing
after
the
d.i.ct.a.torships collapsed, many hailed these two transitions
as proof of the power of nonviolence.
According to this
view, active
nonviolence
had
been
successful
in
traditionally violent cultures, proving
its power as the
proper strategy against entrenched, violent forces
of
oppression.
But do the events of February 1986 deserve their
reputations as something unprecedented in the history of the
two nations? Were they really triumphs of popular active
nonviolence?
What role. if any, was played by religious
pacifism in encouraging
active nonviolence as a strategy
against authoritarian regimes?
What lessons may be learned
by those who would promote active nonviolence as a means to
enhance democracy and social justice?

91

Nonviolence and Authoritarian

Re~imes

These questions are difficult.
To answer them I '-70rked
with Lon Fendall, Director of the Center for Peace Learninq
at George Fox College, to study the events in Haiti and th~
Philippines leading up to February
1986,
talkinq
to
eyewitnesses and reviewing printed
accounts.
Pbss1ble
historical and cultural precedents for the use of nonviolence
in the two countries were identified, and attempts were made
to trace the sources for the ideas of active nonviolence that
were used in late 1985 and early 1986.
This paper reports a
summary of what we learned about the Haitian and Filipino
experiences <note 1).

1. In both Haiti and the Philipiine1, the ideas and practices
of principled active
nonvio ence
were at the core of a
democratic popular movement that took leadership in ousting
the dictators.
The popular movements in the two
countries
were
dissimilar in many ways.
Haiti's movement never developed
visible political leadership, the role played so prominently
by Benigno
and
Corazon Aquino in the Philippines.
The
Haitian movement
was
almost
purely
a
"grass--rooLs"
organization, initiated and sustained by lay and clerical
leaders at
the
parish
level (primarily in the Catholic
Church), and by
various
local leaders in the community
cooperative movement.
Although some Catholic bishops played
prominent roles in encouraging
the Church as a whole to
support the popular movement and its democr·atic aspirations,
and in helping to publicize the movement's views, the
primary energy for the movement came from a decentralized
and almost invisible network of local leaders.
In the Philippines. on the other hand, non-violence
activists had direct access to the leaders of a powerful,
centralized, elite-based opposition political organization.
Wealthy politician Beniqno Aquino was an
advocate
of
non-violent strategy as part
of his efforts to undermine
Ferdinand Marco~.
Corazon Aquino also c~me to 0mbrace
non-violence as a viable strategy in the struggle against
Marcos, although she clearly never became a pacif izt.
In choosing non-violence, Corazon Aquino allied herself
with an organization called AKKAPKA \''Action for Peace 1nd
Justice">. AKKAPKA provided non-violence training, worl<ed tc
develop nonviolent means of re3i~ting oppression, and ended
up counseling Aquino and Cardinal Jaime Sin on how they might
organize a non-violer1t strategy to oust Marcos after he stole
the February 1986 election.
There was no counterpart to
AKKAPKA in Haiti.

Nonviolence and Authoritarian Regimes

2. In both countrie1, it wa1 crucial that fa1t and reliable
means of communication were available amonq nonviolence
activists at key junctures.
In both countries, activists in ecclesiastical and
development organizations were also active in the nonviolent
movement.
But in Haiti, where visible national leadership
was lacking and where the movement was not very active in
Port-au-Prince, these other organizations were
critical
channels of information and coordination.
Movement leaders
communicated primarily through Church channels that had been
established for other purposes.
Other communication was had
by
mail, and
more
significantly in the weeks leading
up
to
Duvalier's
departure, by radio --at times using coded messages. Access
to independent radio stations like the Catholic Radio Soleil
and the Protestant Radio Lumiere was crucial
to
the
movement's success. Demonstrators around the country relied
on these channels of communication for motivation
and
inspiration for their local protest activities.
National networks, ecclesial and
otherwise,
also
existed in the Philippines.
In fact, whereas in Haiti the
Catholic Church was the only national institution other than
the Army and the Duvalierist private security forces, the
Tonton Macoutes, the Philippines was comparatively rich in
non-governmental institutions. Yet they were not so critical
in the Philippines, where the central events in the popular
movement took place in Manila in conjunction with the
military mutiny led by Fidel Ramos and Juan Ponce Enrile. In
that situation, communication among
key
parties
was
face-to-face, and by telephone, even while Corazon Aquino was
on the island of Cebu, far from Manila.
However, as in Haiti, independent radio stations were
important to the popular movement.
Without the Catholic-run
Radio Veritas, it would have
been difficult to issue an
effective call for tens of thousands of people to surround
the military rebel stronghold, frustrating nonviolently the
government's attempts
to
attadc the rebels.
When Radio
Veritas left the air in the midst of the crisis on Sunday
eveniny February 23 lpossibly to avoid its destruction by
government forces>, Catholic reporters found another outlet
in radio station DZRJ <re-christened "Radio Bandido"), which
proved to be a critical source of information until Marcos'
departure on Tuesday.

3. Both countrie1 had some hi1torical experience with active
nonviolent tactics.
But the1e experiences had
little
con1ciou1 impact on
the
popular moveaent1 to brinf down
Marco1 and Duvalier.
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During Haiti's long history of independence \since 1804)
there never has been a constitutional and democratic transfer
of power.
But on three occasions
extra-constitutional
transitions had been accomplished by concerted application of
nonviolent tactics.
In 1934, a series of nonviolent actions
(strikes, boycotts, and demonstrations>
succeeded
in
hastening the departure of U.S. Marines that had occupied
Haiti since 1915.
In 1946, another similar campaign led to
the resignation of corrupt President Elie Lescot.
And in
1956, General Paul Magloire lost his seat in the president's
office as a result of demonstrations, riots, and strikes in
Port-au-Prince.
<Magloire's fall led to Haiti's only fair
direct election of a president -- Francois Duvalier.>
But by 1985, 29 years had passed since th~ last of these
"successful" nonviolent campaigns.
The potential power of
these experiences as
inspiration to the movement against
Duvalier seems to have been largely untapped.
In several
interviews with participants and Haitian observers of the
anti-Duvalier popular movement, no one ever mentioned these
earlier cases as precedent for their own work, even when
asked to identify
any
precedents in Haitian hist'ory for
active nonviolence.
No reference to any connection between
the mid-century movements and the movement of the 1980's has
been recorded in the published material examined for this
research.
This makes it difficult to assess the effects of
previous Haitian experience on the fall of Duvalier.
The
movement in 1985-86 was starkly different from the earlier
campaigns.
They had
all
been
confined
mostly
to
Port-au-Prince in support of particular aspirants for the
president's office.
But the anti-Duvalier movement was
decentralized to
provincial cities, hardly affecting the
capital, and was not supporting any particular candidate for
president <note 2>.
In addition, according to at least one
eyewitness to
some
of
the
earlier
campaigns,
the
anti-Duvalier movement was much more principled in its
conscious adoption of nonviolence as an overall strategy,
while the earlier campaigns
were just being pragmatic in
what was possible without too much bloodshed.
In any event,
more contemporaneous influences were more important
in
shaping the anti-Duvalier popular movement than were Haiti's
own historical experiences.
The Philippines had a more distant but more distinct
historical
experience
of
systematic
and
principled
nonviolence. It was embodied in the life story of Jose Rizal,
martyred in the 1890's for his advocacy of independence from
Spain.
The parallel between Rizal's nonviolent nationalism
and that of Benigno Aquino was not lost on many Filipinos:
both were exiled for their opposition to an authoritarian
government, both became proponents of systematic nonviolence
as the way to achieve liberations, and both were killed by
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government forces soon after their return to the Philippines
from exile.
Another difference
was
the
essentially
nonviolent way in which the Philippines achieved independence
from the United States in the 1940's after World War II,
contrasted with Haiti's heritage of horrific violence leading
to its independence.
Yet, once again, more contemporary
sources seem to have been uppermost in Filipino minds as they
contemplated a nonviolent campaign to oust Marcos.

'· AlthoUfh IOMI

••P•Ctl

of indiflftOUI culture in l&Ch

country were useful in helping people understand principles
of nonviolence, foreigners were the mo1t important 1ource1 of
the idea1 that led to commitment to nonviolence a1 an overall
strategy.

Of the two countries, Haiti had the most distinctly
violent path to independence.
The violent pattern had been
repeated many times before the American Marines intervened
in 1915 to stop a particularly ferocious cycle of domestic
political violence.
Yet Haiti under the Duvaliers was very
tranquil, its domestic quiescence marred only by
the
occasional adventurist insurrection involving ludicrously
small groups of fighters.
<One of the insurrections in the
early 1960's involved seven rebels, five of whom were
American mercenaries.> The tranquility was enforced against
opponents brutally and violently.
The Philippines'
independence was less violent.
But
during the Marcos regime a nascent communist
guerilla
conflict had become
deeply
rooted in many parts of the
Filipino countryside.
The government also struggled with
violent Moslem separatists on in some areas in the South.
Marcos was also able to rely on some cultural concepts
to condone his violence.
Filipinos have
traditionally
con51dered violence acceptable as an exercise by the rich of
their paternalistic
power
<lakas).
Marcos
was
the
beneficiary of Filipino tolerance of violence to counteract
personal shame <hiya> for insults and defeats inflicted by
tl1e victim of
the violence.
In 1935, Marcos apparently
killed a man who had defeated Marcos' father in an election.
The Filipino Supreme Court excused Ferdinand's actions and
ordered the charges against him dropped.
Haitian culture does not encourage overt
violence
against one's opponents.
Rather, in keeping with the tenets
of the dominant voodoo culture, Haitians prefer to resort to
the spirits <loas> for
help in defending themselves from
threatened harms or inflicting harm on their enemies.
If
life is still unbearable, Haitians have historically chosen
to flee the unpalatable situation, taking refuge in remote
areas <a behavior known as marronaqe>.
This aversion to
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public confrontation encouraqes a passive
response
to
conflict that is directly contrary to active nonviolence.
Both cultures
include
some features conducive to a
non-violent approach to life.
In the Philippines, for
instance, compassion <awa> is expected from the powerful for
those vulnerable to that power.
When the balance between
lakas and awa is lost, cultural norms can be upset, costing
the powerful person legitimacy in the eyes of his neighbors.
Rural Haitians have long practiced communal forms of mutual
assistance with major farming tasks, which helped them adapt
to cooperative strategies against the Duvaliers.
But overall, the predominant source of inspiration about
nonviolence in both countries came from sources external to
either country.
Gandhi and
Martin Luther Kinq were two
prominent sources of inspiration (especially Gandhi in the
Philippines and King in Haiti), as are many of the nonviolent
exponents of liberation theology.
At the tactical level, there was also plenty of foreign
influence, although local innovations proved to be the
deciding factor in whatever success the popular movements
enjoyed.
The AKKAPKA-sponsored workshops on nonviolence
were led
by
representatives
of
the
Fellowship
of
Reconciliation from the United States.
Some of the tactics
used in Haiti were adopted from models outside the country.
But in each
case, at
critical periods in the campaign,
tactics were devised by those on the scene.
For example,
when the crowds around the Filipino military rebels found
themselves in confrontation
with troops loyal to Marcos,
observers record that people seemed to innovate on the spot
means of
communicating
nonviolence to the heavily armed
soldiers.

s.

The Catholic Church was the most important chaMel of
ideas &!:>out nonviolence
from outside these two cultures.
Non-Catholic 1ource1 were influential in a limited numl:>er of
ca••• where there
had
been extensive involvement in and
commitment to the community creating high levels of trust.
Liberation theology was a primarily Catholic invention,
and the principal vehicle by which notions of
active
nonviolence. entered
these
two countries.
It provided a
rationale and method of organization (in the base Christian
communities>, and an undergirding philosophy of concern for
the poor and awareness of the social structures involved in
oppression.
The Catholic Church was in a position to
transmit these ideas because of its central and trusted role
at the heart of both cultures.
Yet the transmission was not without interference.
In
both countries. a relatively conservative Catholic hierarchy
had to be converted along with the rest of the populace. Yet
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converted it was, at least sufficiently to boost the movement
until the
dictators
were dispatched (note 3).
And the
visible support of key elements of the hierarchy proved to be
invaluable in generating broader support among the populace,
so necessary in overwhelming the government's readiness to
engage in violence against its own people.
The key element
was the trust
placed
in
the Church by its millions of
adherents.
Non-Catholic groups did
not
have the same level of
built-in trust in
either society.
Some Protestants were
influential with key individuals under circumstances where
their long-term involvement in meeting human needs had
established a basis for trust.
Thus, Mennonites in Haiti,
long active in development work in Verettes in the center of
the country, impressed some activists in the
popular
movement with their witness for nonviolence, communicated in
the course of common
work on translating the Bible into
Creole.
The Fellowship
of
Reconciliation team that led
workshops for AKKAPKA gained entry through personal contacts
that established trust with AKKAPKA leaders.
Yet Quakers
are practically invisible in Haiti, and are hindered in the
Philippines by their small
numbers and lack of long-term
engagement in the political process.

6.
'I'ho1e committed to nonviolence a1 a permanent way ot
life worked 1ucce11fully with tho1e adoptinf nonviolence a1 a
possibly temiorary
strate~,
with the underetanding that
violence wou d play no part
in the campaiqn to oust the
dictators.
Neither
Corazon
Aquino
nor
Cardinal
Sin
were
unconditionally committed to
nonviolence, not in the way
that Bishop Francisco Claver or others in the Philippines
were.
And in Haiti, one
eyewitness estimated that only

about one
oppo:31tion

third of the leading activ1st5 in the underground
were
committed unconditionally to nonviolence.

They were enthusiastic participants in the cau5e, however,
because of the general
consensus among all the activists
that this campaign
against
the
Duvaliers
would
be
nonviolent.
It was this consensus that made the cooperation
possible -- but in both countries, unity after the dictators
left was hindered by lack of underlying agreement about the
legitimacy of violence in social change.

7. Althouqh conscious application of the tactic• of active
nonviolence wa1 a necessary cauee of the fall of the two
dictator1hip1, neither ca11 can be d11crib1d a1 a victory won
entirely by nonviolence. In both ca1e1 di1affection with the
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qovernaent aaonq key a111tary leader• and !oreitn foverna1nt1
played a major part in the cour1e of event1.

In the Philippines, it is hard to imagine how Aquino
could have
prevailed
over Marcos without the catalyzing
effect of the military mutiny led by Enrile and Ramos.
With
a substantial but hugely outnumbered force camped in Manila,
Filipinos had a symbol and focal point for their defiance of
Marcos.
Although shooting did not erupt between loyalists
and the rebels, the potential was always there, especially
after some key defections to the rebels strengthened their
hand militarily.
Would a
focal point outside the armed
forces, without the potential threat of a violent coup, have
served the movement as well?
·
In Haiti, the popular movement did not have the open
support of any elements of the armed forces, so its actions
are less tainted by the potential for violence.
Yet in the
end, the movement was not the only force at work against
Duvalier.
As in the Philippines, the United States played a
crucial role in finally convincing the dictator to leave.
But there is substantial
evidence that Duvalier was also
undone by the loss of military support for his regime.
The
armed forces did not join the popular movement, but certain
key officers <Gen. Henri Namphy and Col. Williams Regala
among them) had decided Duvalier was on his way out.
By
late January, troops were doing
nothing
to
prevent
demonstrations, and Namphy apparently was working with the
Americans to negotiate a post-Duvalier government.

a.

Both ca1e1
caapaiCJn• which
intervention of
limited aucce11
culture.

off er
coapellinf evidence that nonviolent
take a shortcut to their climax due to the
military and/or diplomatic coercion achieve
in tran1forminq the political
conflict

Certainly neither political conflict culture has been
radically transformed.
Haitian governments still appear to
be based on superior force, and democracy is still a dream.
Aquino's government
contends
with vigilante violence and
armed insurrections, which have not yielded to her early
attempts at peacemaking.
Armed might is still necessary to
retain power in both countries, and improvement is slow or
nonexistent for the poor and powerless.
In Haiti, movement activists tend to believe that
frustrations since Duvalier's fall are due in large part to a
premature climax in the struggle against Duvalierism.
By
managing Duvalier's departure in a way convenient to Army
officers and the
United States qovernment, the political
maturation of the opposition may have been prevented, leaving
it fragmented after the unifying goal of deposing Duvalier
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was achieved.
Had the struggle continued for a few more
weeks or months, political
leadership might have emerged
strong enough to prevent a reimposition of military rule.
It is a little
harder
to make such a case in the
Philippines. The strong political leadership was there in
the person
of
Corazon Aquino.
Yet one wonders whether
another scenario might have been possible, leading to the
ouster of Marcos without such obvious assistance
from
military rebels, and helping to reshape Filipino political
culture into a stable democracy.

9. Forei;n intervention in authoritarian-ruled 1y1tem1 can
have con1tructive effect if it ~uttre11e1 a democratic
nonviolent conflict
culture without
reinforcinf the

authoritarian reqime.

Although it seems that American intervention to ease the
departure of the dictators may have stunted the development
of democracy in these two countries, not all
foreign
intervention was debilitating.
In Haiti,
U.S. president
Jimmy Carter's pressure for greater respect for human rights
had a very
positive
effect on events.
As a result of
Carter's influence. Jean-Claude Duvalier relaxed controls on
the press and on travel outside the country.
It was during
this "Carter spring" that
the
underground
opposition
blossomed, and became more familiar with and committed to
ideas about active nonviolence
that
were
circulating
internationally.
The "Carter spring" was important as an element in the
preparation for an even more dramatic turning point: Pope
John Paul II's visit to Haiti in March of 1983.
The Pope
electrified his Catholic audience by issuing uncompromising
calls for political and social change in Haiti.
It was the
key moment in unleashing
Catholics who had been prepared

during

and

after

the brief "Carter spring·• for more active

opposition to Duvalierist dictatorship.
A similar visit by the Pope in 1981 was important to the
Philippines.
But the
real
catalyst for change was the
assassination of Benigno Aquino on his return from exile in
1983.
In this case, the American role was distinctly
constructive, offering refuge to
Aquino
from
Marcos
persecution while he worked out his nonviolent strategy for
change.
In addition, American political freedom
and
connections to the Philippines allowed Aquino to remain in
contact with Marcos opponents even from his exile, and may
have been important in Corazon's development as a potential
leader.
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10. .F'oreirn intervention to di1couraf1 u11 ••1frat1on uy
h8lp promote ettect1v1 popular oppo1ition to authoritarian
regimes.

This point applies most directly to
the
Haitian
situation.
As noted above, one of the traditional Haitian
responses to untenable injustice has been to flee the
situation, finding refuge in some remote area of
the
country.
This marronage served the country well prior to
independence, and during the first century afterward.
But
as Haiti has become more densely populated, and the central
government more adept at national soc~al control, marronage
has ceased to be .available within Hai ti.
Instead, larqe
numbers of poor Haitians who have been fleeing the country,
especially over the last ten years.
But the "boat
people"
began arriving in the United
States in numbers sufficient to burden this
country's
ability to provide services.
As a result, during the early
1980's the American government cracked down on Haitian
refugees trying to reach the United States by intercepting
the leaky Haitian boats close to Haitian waters, and quickly
returning them to Haiti.
Observers at the time anticipated that this policy would
close an important
safety
valve for tensions within the
country.
The loss of the opportunity for escape accelerated
the grwoth of pressures
within
Haitian
society
for
improvement in
living
conditions and political freedoms.
The unrest was
focussed
against Duvalier by the growing
public criticism
and
opposition
emanating
from
the
cooperative movement and the Church, especially the tilegliz
<Haiti's version of the base Christian communities>.
With
nowhere else to
go, and
no real prospects for economic
opportunity, the poor who had moved to regional urban
centers seeking work became the hotbed
of
opposition
activity.
Without the powder kegs in Gonaives, Cap Haitien,
and other cities where squatters huddled in filthy slums,
many of whom might otherwise have emigt'.).ted to the United
States, the popular movement may never have gained enough
energy to successfully pressure Duvalier to leave.

CONCLUSION
Mediator trainees are urged
to be advocates for the
process, but not for a particular outcome.
To advocate for
an outcome inserts the mediator into the relationship among
disputing parties in a way that damages their ability ti.)
make their relationship work.
A similar principle seems to be at the heart of what we
can learn from events in Haiti and
the
Philippines.
Foreigners have had crucial and positive effects while
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advocating forcefully for key process values: nonviolence,
freedoms of speech, press and religion, and
political
pt·ocesses that give equal voice to all social groups.
These
were the messages carried by Jimmy Carter, Pope John Paul
II, and scores
of
individuals in religious conferences,
development projects, and other contacts.
The message can
be conveyed by an individual who has earned respect through
her commitment to the life of the people, or by a powerful
political figure uncompromising in her steadfast insistence
that people be given a voice in their own affairs.
The
message can help when it is received by the poorest members
of society, or when the only direct listeners are the very
oppressors themselves <as in Carter's message to Duvalier
requesting greater respect for human rights>.
But when the foreign peacemakers begin to move beyond
advocacy for the
process
<e.g., for
human
rights,
nonviolence, and democracy)
to actually bringing
about
thr.ough their own influence specific political outcomes
--even the removal of a hated dictator -- there is grave
danger that true peace will get trampled in our rush toward
our preconceived notions.

NOTES
1.
A fuller report of
our study of Haiti and the
Philippines is contained in a monograph we have completed
with support from the United States Institute of Peace.
2.
In fact, the Filipino experience in 1986 bore a much
stronger resemblance to the earlier Haitian campaigns than
did the modern Haitian movement.
3.

It

is

interesting

to

·note that the Vatican was

uncomfortable ~1th the Church's part15an advocacy for Aquino
in the Ph111ppine5. but apparently had no :3uch feelinqe atout
the Church s activities in Haiti, ~here the movement-was not
1

supporting any particular contestant for power.
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